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Abstract 
The diffusion of technological knowledge is key to industry growth. But not all knowledge is 
created equal. I use a nanoeconomic approach to examine knowledge-diffusion based growth in 
the Meiji-era Japanese cotton spinning industry, which enjoyed remarkable success after a decade 
of initial failure. By tracing sources of technological knowledge to individual engineers, I find that 
successful technology diffusion required the right kind of human capital embodying and 
transmitting knowledge, and a competitive environment that rewarded talent while weeding out 
incompetence. 
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I. Introduction 
The rate at which new techniques are adopted and incorporated into the productive process has 
long been recognized as “one of the central questions of economic growth" (Rosenberg, 1972). In 
the neoclassical growth theory operating with the notion of a representative firm, technology is 
viewed as “disembodied,” and its diffusion as happening through an “externality” (e.g., Lucas, 
1988). The same is essentially true of theories of endogenous growth, where new technologies are 
generated through targeted investments but still conducted by firms that are ex ante identical and 
utilizing accumulated past knowledge available to them as a disembodied externality (e.g., Romer, 
1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991). 
In the seminal paper in the literature on industry evolution (Gort and Klepper, 1982), 
Michael Gort and Steven Klepper proposed a different approach, one that was based on 
“Schumpeterian dynamics, and the explicit recognition of heterogeneity among firms” (Agarwal 
and Braguinsky, forthcoming). The initial focus of this approach, however, was not so much on 
the process of knowledge diffusion as on industry-specific knowledge accumulation by incumbent 
firms. The basic idea is formulated in Gort and Klepper (1982: 632-33) where they hypothesize 
that accumulated non-transferable firm-specific knowledge becomes progressively more important 
compared to transferable individually appropriable knowledge as the industry matures. In the 
formal model offered by Klepper (1996), incumbents absorb innovations by new entrants 
automatically and almost instantaneously, and the specific channels through which such 
innovations and their diffusion occur are not explicitly considered (see also Jovanovic and 
MacDonald, 1994, for a similar approach to diffusion). 
Compared to this, there has been less attention in the literature dedicated to generation 
and diffusion of knowledge, especially at early stages of the industry life-cycle (notable exceptions 
include Agarwal and Gort, 2001; Agarwal and Bayus, 2002; Moeen and Agarwal, 2015; among 
others). This is particularly true with regard to nanofactors that ensure generation and diffusion 
not of any but of the right kind of knowledge. Klepper himself has certainly recognized the 
importance of this factor, as witnessed by the fact that he would trace the success of whole 
industries to one exceptionally gifted (and oftentimes, as he argued, also hard-to-work-with) 
individual (Ransom Olds in the U.S. auto industry, William Shockley in Silicon Valley – see 
Klepper, 2016, especially Chapter 3). This paper aims at contributing to this aspect of industry 
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evolution literature by employing nanoeconomic approach and historical methodology (Klepper, 
2011; see also Braguinsky and Hounshell, 2015b).  
One problem that presents itself when examining instances of knowledge diffusion in early 
stages of the industry lifecycle is that industry evolution research has dealt almost exclusively with 
success stories (a notable exception is Lerner, 2009). While this is understandable, it leads to a 
problem well known in econometrics as “sample selection bias.” In other words, the analysis of 
success cases of knowledge diffusion-based industry growth lacks a control group against which 
these cases can be meaningfully compared. The problem is even more severe at the firm level. 
Tracing firms’ backgrounds requires painstaking effort and often proves impossible outside of 
already known successful clusters, such as Silicon Valley (Klepper, 2010). The data on firm 
performance and even survival are often also available to a researcher only on a subset of the total 
firm population of the industry, namely, those of them that had a chance to grow large enough and 
thus were relatively successful. But firm-level success is not always attributable solely to superior 
technological knowledge; hence, examining the process of knowledge creation and diffusion on 
the subsample of successful firms only may result in hindsight bias, where things that happened 
are interpreted as being much more pre-determined or inevitable than they actually were (Fischoff, 
1980). One way of avoiding such bias is to keep full records of a nascent industry right from the 
outset. While such cases in the past seem to be extremely rare, they should become more available 
as more effort is dedicated to such fact-recording about new emerging industries. 
While in the ideal world a researcher would like to have a “randomized” experiment to 
tease out the factors that distinguish knowledge diffusion-based success and failure, such an 
experiment is, of course, not feasible. Without it, we need to study cases where industries initially 
struggled to find their ways of diffusing the best kind of knowledge and start growing and then 
found a way to succeed through what Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) aptly called the “self-discovery” 
process. The case of the Meiji-era Japanese cotton spinning industry presents a unique opportunity 
in this regard. Its spectacular success, based on “super-fast” (Saxonhouse, 1974) diffusion of the 
best technological and managerial practices, has been studied in the English-language literature 
for at least forty years.i Less well known is the fact that this success came very closely on the heels 
of an earlier failure of what at least on the surface looked like a very similar attempt. Most actors 
(firms and individuals) also overlapped and kept interacting with each other during both phases, 
making it possible to compare directly the factors that led to success and those that led to failure.  
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I employ the “nanoeconomic” database built in collaboration with Japanese colleagues, 
Atsushi Ohyama, and Tetsuji Okazaki, to examine both early struggles and eventual success of 
this industry, and by doing so, to advance our understanding of what it takes to generate and diffuse 
the right kind of knowledge in a nascent industry. Another contribution of this paper is that it 
(together with other related papers mentioned below) fundamentally recasts our understanding of 
the emergence of the first, globally competitive industrial sector in a non-Western country.ii The 
historical circumstances surrounding this development, described in the next section, made the 
story even more amazing. 
Three other recent papers draw on parts of the same database. In Braguinsky, Ohyama, 
Okazaki, and Syverson (2015) we examine the role played by mergers and acquisitions in 
improving plant-level productivity and profitability during the industry consolidation phase in the 
first two decades of the 20th century. In Braguinsky and Hounshell (2015b) coevolution of the 
industry and the firms comprising it is examined from strategic management point of view through 
several stages of industry evolution. The paper most closely related to this one is Braguinsky and 
Hounshell (2015a), which retells the “tale” in Gary Saxonhouse’s (1974) pioneering article on 
cooperative technology diffusion in the Japanese cotton spinning industry, clarifying the role 
played by market competition as opposed to the industry association (Boren). The current paper 
advances both the data and the analysis in Braguinsky and Hounshell (2015a). Specifically, I 
examine the impact of different sources of technological knowledge and diffusion networks on 
individual firms’ technological choices and outcomes. These sources are traced to individual 
engineers and technologists (together with their educational background and experience) at the 
center of each network. As a result of this more detailed “nanoanalysis,” I am able to characterize 
more fully than was possible before both the failure and the success parts of the story and to link 
the factors that led to different outcomes in seemingly uniform environment to links between firms 
and engineers they hired. 
In the next section I summarize extant research in the form of several “stylized facts,” and 
I then describe two unresolved research questions that emerge from those and which this paper 
tries to shed light on. Section III contains a brief description of the evolution of the Meiji-era cotton 
spinning industry in Japan and my data sources. In Section IV I present an in-depth, 
“nanoeconomic” analysis of the process of knowledge accumulation and diffusion in this industry 
from its early failure to the later success. By doing so I address the research questions stated in 
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Section II by identifying the most important factors that made the transition from failed knowledge 
diffusion to a successful one possible. Such an examination is greatly facilitated by incredibly rich 
archival materials on the industry, which allow me to follow the universe of all firms and 
production facilities operating in the industry virtually from its inception and directly observe their 
technological choices as well as interfirm flows of knowledge through founders’ networks and 
worker training. Section V concludes. 
 
II.1 Some “stylized facts” from extant studies 
The first “stylized fact” that can be distilled from past research is that the initial impetus to industry 
success usually comes from experimentation by a few standout entrepreneurs (firms) or sometimes 
even from one single such firm. In the U.S. auto industry it was Ransom Olds and Olds Motor 
Works (Klepper, 2010), in the TV receivers industry it was Vladimir Zworykin (RCA) and Philo 
Farnsworth (Klepper and Simons, 2000), in the U.S. semiconductor industry it was William 
Shockley and Fairchild Semiconductor (Klepper, 2009), and in the personal computer industry it 
was Steve Jobs and Apple (e.g., Isaacson, 2011). The evidence is not limited to the U.S.; in fact, 
multiple similar cases have been identified across countries and historical epochs: such as Eiichi 
Shibusawa and Osaka Spinning Company in Japan’s cotton spinning industry circa late 19th 
century (Braguinsky and Hounshell, 2015b), Thonet Brothers and Kohn Brothers in the Austrian 
bentwood furniture industry around the same time (Kiriazidou and Pesendorfer, 1999), Salmones 
Antartica in the late twentieth century Chilean salmon industry (Petrobielli and Rabelotti, 2004), 
and Desh Garments in recent Bangladeshi garment industry (Mostafa and Klepper, 2011). 
The second “stylized fact” is that technological and managerial practices developed 
through experimentation by the best firms diffuse not as a “disembodied externality” but through 
movement of individuals possessing relevant knowledge and experience. Hounshell and Smith 
(1988: Ch. 3) demonstrate on the example of the post-World War I U.S. dyestuff industry that even 
full access to disembodied knowledge in the form of patent descriptions was not enough to close 
the gap with the German industry until Du Pont (in blatant violation of international legal 
arrangements) head-hunted top German chemical engineers. Klepper’s “nanoeconomic” studies of 
several U.S. industries noted above also clearly demonstrate that the diffusion of best practices 
and firm outcomes can be unambiguously traced to such “embodied” transfer of knowledge and 
experience through the human capital of firm founders.iii 
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The third “stylized fact” is that many cases of spectacular growth through knowledge 
diffusion tend to happen in strongly competitive and globally connected environments. In the 
above-mentioned cases of the Japanese cotton spinning industry, the Austrian bentwood furniture 
industry, the Chilean salmon industry, and the Bangladeshi garment industry the environment was 
that of a nascent industry establishing its position in a globally competitive export market. Fierce 
competition has been and continues to be the hallmark of Silicon Valley, and early U.S. auto and 
tire industries present similar pictures. Summarizing a large number of studies of industrial clusters 
world-wide, Morosini (2004, p. 316) observes that “firms in industrial clusters that present a high 
degree of knowledge integration and compete globally, innovate more, present stronger growth 
patterns, adapt to changing environmental conditions more rapidly and have a more sustainable 
economic performance than firms in less integrated clusters that tend to compete within strictly 
local geographic boundaries.” 
The fourth “stylized fact” is that access to finance plays an important role in the process of 
emergence of new industries, which face a rapidly changing environment with a lot of uncertainty 
and risks. While self-financing in the long run can undo most of the damage caused by capital 
misallocation in situations where productivity shocks are persistent, in environments characterized 
by transient productivity shocks, the ability of entrepreneurs to self-finance is considerably 
hampered (Moll, 2014). The latter is exactly what an emerging industry is likely to face and 
therefore nascent industries normally have to rely on either the government providing the initial 
market for their products or on venture capital financing (Goldfarb et al., 2012; Klepper, 2016). 
 
II.2 Questions for further research 
Two questions that require further research emanate from the above “stylized facts.” The first such 
question is what exactly the factors are that make possible knowledge diffusion of the right kind 
from the best firms to the rest of the industry. Existing literature, as discussed immediately below, 
points to several potential factors but it is not quite clear how they interact with each other. The 
second, and closely related, question is why spectacular success stories of industry growth through 
knowledge diffusion are still so rare. 
With respect to the first question above, Klepper himself emphasized “the role established 
firms, particularly the leading ones, played in involuntarily training the next round of entrepreneurs 
that propelled their industries forward” (Braguinsky and Klepper, 2009: 29).iv The evidence from 
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employee startups in the automobile industry in Detroit, the semiconductor industry in Silicon 
Valley, the U.S. laser industry, and others show that they were indeed motivated mainly by the 
unwillingness of their employers to aggressively pursue promising new ideas (see also Agarwal, 
Echambadi, Franco, and Sarkar, 2004). Klepper and Thompson (2010) present a theory based on 
disagreements stemming from differentiated ability that would account for this phenomenon. 
There is another strand in the literature, however, that emphasizes knowledge diffusion 
through what looks like a deliberate decision by industry-leading firms. For example, when asked 
about the strategy adopted by Bell Laboratories of not just licensing their innovations but also 
telling the licensees all that they knew, the firm’s vice president for electronic components 
development reportedly said: “We realized that if this thing was as big as we thought, we couldn’t 
keep it to ourselves and we couldn’t make all the technical contributions. It was to our interest to 
spread it around. If you cast your bread on the water, sometimes it comes back angel food cake” 
(cited in Tilton, 1971: 75-76). In the 1950s, Bell Laboratories also “emerged as the major source 
of semiconductor scientists and engineers, and has since served as the principal training ground 
for numerous semiconductor specialists.” (ibid., p. 81).v In Japan’s Meiji-era cotton spinning 
industry incumbent firms proactively helped new entrants by offering training to their employees 
and generally kept almost all the information about best technological and managerial practices 
open (Saxonhouse, 1974). Similarly, in Austrian bentwood furniture industry “an important feature 
… was the free flow of information …  New technical achievements and product designs were 
exploited not only by the firm that invented them, but also by competitors” (Kiriazidou and 
Pesendorfer, 1999: 157). Instances of “collective search” have also been uncovered in a large 
number of other important historical cases, from the Cleveland Steel District (Allen, 1983) and 
Cornish steam engine (Nuvolari, 2004) in England at the dawn of the industrial revolution, to flat 
panel display industry (Spencer, 2003), to early personal computer industry (Meyer, 2003).  
Regarding the second question, the lack of trying is certainly not the reason. On the 
contrary, once successful cases became widely known, they inevitably sparked attempts to imitate 
them. One early known example comes from British Dyes (Limited), a company established with 
a specific task to emulate the German system of innovation in the dyestuff industry. The project 
went nowhere because it “has made use of entirely unskilled agents––and, as was to be expected, 
the failure has been complete” (Science, Vol. 68, No. 1239, 1918, p. 314). More recent attempts 
in various countries to create high-technology clusters modeled after Silicon Valley––from the 
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Brittany province in France in the 1990s, to “BioValley” in Malaysia, to Australia’s BITS 
(Building on Information Technology Strengths) incubator program––have all also failed due to 
either bad incentives or lack of competence or both (Lerner, 2009). 
Globally connected, competitive environment (“stylized fact” number 3 above) appears to 
be the key in answering both above questions. With regard to employee startups as a way of 
promoting innovation and diffusion, these are clearly fostered by eliminating non-competes and 
other anti-competitive practices as well as providing venture capital financing to new startups. 
Numerous studies show that contrary to the views pushed by incumbent firms, allowing employees 
to move freely and start their own firms increases both the rates of innovation and diffusion (see, 
e.g., Gilson, 1999; Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming, 2009). 
Less obvious but nevertheless true is that innovation and diffusion through collaboration 
and knowledge sharing also tend to thrive in a competitive environment. The description of the 
Homebrew Computer Club from which Apple emerged in Isaacson (2011) leaves no doubt that 
young “geeks” in that club were fiercely competitive even as they shared ideas with each other. 
As detailed below, fierce competition that did not allow the survival of inefficient firms was also 
a salient feature of the knowledge-sharing based success in Japanese cotton spinning. From a 
theory vantage point, the initial limited size of the industry (compared to the size of the potential 
market) makes it possible for knowledge sharing to be privately optimal under competitive markets 
(see Braguinsky, Gabdrakhmanov, and Ohyama, 2007; Braguinsky and Rose, 2009). 
Competitive environment, in confluence with access to initial financing (“stylized fact” 
number 4 above), also likely holds the key to answering the second question posed above, as to 
why success cases are so rare. There is a natural tendency to use public sources to secure initial 
financing and/or provide the initial market to a new industry with uncertain technology and no 
established best practices. Cases where this happened without interfering with global 
connectedness and the principle of competition (e.g., semiconductor industry in Taiwan––see 
Mathews, 1997––or Yozma program in Israel––see Avnimelech and Teubal, 2004) were 
successful but also rare. As a general rule, maintaining competition in the face of challenges of a 
new, especially high-tech industry has proven to be elusive, not least because of some conventional 
wisdoms about “infant industry” and intellectual monopoly protection still pervasive among 
policy-makers (Boldin and Levine, 2010). It is especially important to emphasize in this context 
that competition and global connectedness not only help prevent capture by special interests, but 
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also allocate scarce resources to areas where there is already a basis of required knowledge and 
competence.vi The examination of the Meiji-era cotton spinning industry in Japan beginning in the 
next section will present some additional insights into these issues. 
 
III. Meiji-era cotton spinning industry in Japan: overview and data 
Japan opened up to foreign trade in the 1860s after 250 years of autarky. This opening up of the 
country was so “sudden and complete” that it allowed to treat this case as a “natural experiment” 
to explore the empirical validity of the comparative advantage theory (Bernhofen and Brown, 
2004). In line with that theory, Japan’s pre-modern manufacturing production was wiped out, with 
cotton yarn experiencing the combination of the largest fall in relative price from autarky to the 
free trade regime and the highest negative net exports (ibid., Figure 4). 
Needless to say, mechanized cotton spinning was the industry that started the industrial 
revolution in England, and it was the industry that each country that embarked on the path of 
industrialization during the nineteenth century tried to establish first. In 1878, the Meiji 
government, deeply concerned about the growing amount of specie flowing out for imported 
textile goods, started promoting the cotton spinning industry by constructing and operating “model 
mills” and by purchasing British spinning machinery and reselling it to private entrepreneurs it 
recruited at subsidized prices and with easy loan terms. In 1882, it created the “All Japan Cotton 
Spinners Association” (known by its Japanese acronym “Boren”) with the specific aim of 
facilitating the transfer of best-practice spinning technology to and its diffusion within Japan. 
Boren immediately began collecting and disseminating (initially through the government-issued 
“Official Gazette” and later through its monthly bulletin, “Geppo”) detailed firm-level data on 
inputs (machine spindles in operation, number of male and female operatives, type of engines 
operating the plant and its horse power, the amount of cotton yarn consumed in production, and 
separately the amount of recovered waste cotton, etc.) and output (the amount of cotton yarn 
produced, its main count,vii the amount of waste yarn), as well as firm-specific output prices and 
operatives’ wages. These monthly tables, preserved in archival records until our time, serve as one 
of the sources of the data used in this study.viii 
Early studies tended to credit these efforts with helping the industry to overcome the initial 
difficulties of industrialization (e,g., Smith, 1955; Landes, 1965). In reality, however, the 
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government-led effort by itself did not accomplish this. Figure 1 presents the earliest available data 
on domestic output, imports and exports of cotton yarn in physical units (thousands of pounds). 
 [Figure 1 about here] 
As can be seen from Figure 1, domestic output remains negligible until 1885, and while it 
starts increasing beginning in 1886, it hardly puts a dent in imports until the very end of the 1880s. 
More importantly, as firm-level data presented below show, the upward trend in domestic output 
starting from 1886 came from knowledge sources that had nothing to do with government efforts 
to promote the industry. 
In 1886 the government withdrew both its support and intervention in the industry. As 
documented by government’s own historians writing some fourteen years later (Enkakukiji, 1900, 
Chapter 1), the main reason was poor performance of government-promoted mills contrasted to 
the success of the first large private company to emerge in the industry by that time (Osaka 
Spinning Company, more on this below). This abrupt policy change laid the foundation for the 
period of coexistence between former government-aided mills and new independent private 
entrants, allowing me to compare the process of technology and knowledge diffusion between 
these two categories operating in the same period and under the same market environment. 
 Figure 2 shows the dynamics of domestic output, imports and exports of cotton yarn in 
Japan over the 1890s. As can be seen already from Figure 1, the industry took off in the very last 
few years of the 1880s and domestic output exceeded imports for the first time in 1890. Figure 2 
shows that output continued to grow at a very fast rate throughout the subsequent 10 years, while 
imports quickly became an afterthought and instead exports burgeoned in the second half of the 
1890s. After consolidation in the early 1900s, the industry continued to grow rapidly and by the 
1920s became one of the largest in the world, a major player on the global cotton yarn export 
market. Almost all of this growth came from new private mills. Boren was reorganized into the 
association of independent producers in 1888 but its functions remained essentially the same, and 
it continued to operate as the institutional arrangement for knowledge diffusion and technology 
dissemination albeit under new leadership. This, along with other evidence from the history of the 
industry (see Kinugawa, 1964), shows that there was little change in the way knowledge diffusion 
was organized at the industry level between the 1880s and the 1890s. 
In the next section I conduct an in-depth, “nanoeconomic” investigation of the process of 
knowledge diffusion in Japan’s cotton spinning industry during the first two decades of its 
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existence (the 1880s and the 1890s). I compare technology choices adopted by firms that relied on 
government-aided knowledge diffusion mechanism to technology choices adopted by independent 
private entrants and their sources. These differences can be linked directly to very different 
outcomes observed in Figures 1 and 2.  
As mentioned, the data on input and output choices come from the monthly data collected 
by Boren. These are supplemented by the data on dates of founding (defined as the date when the 
registration of the firm was granted by the prefectural authority in charge of business registry) and 
dates of the actual start of operation for each firm that operated in the industry at some point from 
the early 1880s-end of the 1890s from “Enkakukiji,” the unpublished but highly influential 
industry history written by the Japanese government sources at the beginning of the twentieth  
century. Enkakukiji also contains the data on the number and type (ring or mule) of spindles 
installed and decommissioned by each firm in each year. The information on the backgrounds of 
founders, top managers and technicians comes from the seven-volume history of the industry 
written in the 1930s by Taiichi Kinugawa (Kinugawa, 1964), which contains separate chapters 
dedicated to each firm. Whenever possible, I verified this information and supplemented it using 
firms’ shareholder reports and firm-specific information published in Boren’s monthly bulletins 
(“Geppo”). Educational background of engineers was also verified through the lists of graduates 
of the Imperial College of Engineering (later Imperial University Department of Engineering). 
Technology data on the characteristics of machinery ordered by different firms in the 1880s and 
1890s used below come from the file compiled by Gary Saxonhouse and Patrick McGuire and 
archived on the ICPSR web site (Wright, 2011). Braguinsky and Hounshell (2015a) describe these 
data sources in more detail. 
 
IV.1. Knowledge diffusion and technology choices under government sponsorship 
Even though first attempts to establish mechanized cotton spinning industry in Japan date back to 
the 1860s, the process started in earnest in the late 1870s. As mentioned, the Meiji government, 
promoted the industry by creating “model mills” and subsidizing about a dozen more by 
purchasing British spinning machinery and reselling it at subsidized prices and with easy loan 
terms. Despite the obvious failure of those efforts in terms of increasing domestic production and 
replacing imports (see Figure 1 above), it is still possible, at least in theory, that those efforts 
“produced important demonstration effects and trained many skilled artisans and managers” 
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(Rodrik, 2014: 83), and thus contributed to knowledge diffusion that sparked subsequent 
spectacular industry growth. It is thus important to examine the available “nano” evidence about 
knowledge diffusion in early years of the industry. 
 Government-led knowledge dissemination conducted through early Boren was 
supervised by its technology “guru,” Masatatsu Ishikawa (1825-1895). Ishikawa’s biography is 
described in detail in Kinugawa (1964, I: Ch. 3). According to it, he was born in an educator’s 
family but was not a “samurai” (nobleman) by birth. He left home at the age of twenty to study in 
Nagasaki, the port city in the south of Japan, which was the only one open for trade and cultural 
exchange with the West at the time. The only nation to which Nagasaki was open at the time was 
the Dutch, so Ishikawa learned the Dutch language. It appears that he had never learned to read or 
understand English, so when he later needed to understand a technical document about cotton 
spinning written in English, he had to send it to Nagasaki to have it translated first. The translation 
endeavor alone took a whole year (Kinugawa, 1964, I: 87). 
 Ishikawa had no training as an engineer, let alone as an engineer in cotton spinning 
(whatever studies in engineering he completed while at Nagasaki appear to have been on military 
artillery). Nevertheless, in what was still the pre-Meiji Japan he landed a job with Nariakira 
Shimazu, the Lord of Satsuma (modern day’s Kagoshima prefecture on the southern tip of the 
southernmost island of Kyushu) who awarded him the rank of a “samurai” and made him his 
personal advisor. 
 Using its remote location to evade the rules forbidding contacts with foreign powers, 
Satsuma principality was the first in pre-Meiji Japan to start exploring ways to modernize its 
economic and military capacity. Pre-empting the central government’s efforts, Nariakira Shimazu 
sponsored and oversaw the construction of the first hub of experimental western-style factories in 
Japan (“shuseikan”), right by his seaside summer residence. The factories included the first 
reverberatory furnace in Japan used to cast Satsuma’s own iron cannons and a small shipbuilding 
yard, but they were all destroyed by the British artillery fire during the two-day Anglo-Satsuma 
War in August 1863. Satsuma-fired cannons, however, did inflict some serious damage on the 
British fleet as well. The two sides quickly made peace. In 1865 Satsuma sent a mission to England, 
one of the aims of which was to request assistance from Platt Brothers of Oldham in adding a 
modern cotton textile factory to its rebuilt industrial hub. ix Thus, the first mechanized cotton 
spinning and weaving mill in Japan started operating in Kagoshima in 1867. 
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 It is not clear if Ishikawa directly oversaw the operations of this first mill, but archival 
documents show that he was put in charge of the next one set up the next year by Satsuma on the 
land it owned in the city of Sakai, near Osaka, the heart of Japanese industry and commerce at the 
time. In 1872 the new Meiji government bought the mill from Satsuma and converted it into its 
first “model” mill tasked with spreading mechanized cotton spinning. Ishikawa continued to run 
the mill, and became employed by the government. Subsequently, the government ordered him to 
set up the Aichi National Mill, a brand-new plant that was designed to become the flagship of the 
government-promoted cotton-spinning industry (it started operating in 1881). Seventeen more 
mills either directly owned by the government (including prefectural governments) or subsidized 
by the government started operating between 1882-1885. Ten of those were designed, assembled 
and started operating under supervision from Ishikawa or his close associates also employed by 
the government. Seven other mills, even though they also received financial support from the 
government, were not guided by Ishikawa. Instead, they relied on engineers they themselves hired 
and/or on advice obtained from another pioneering firm, founded in Tokyo in 1865 (that is, also 
prior to Meiji restoration) by a private entrepreneur Manbei Kashima (Okamoto, 1995). 
 To examine whether technology diffusion through government-appointed technology 
advisor (Ishikawa or his subordinates, hereafter “Ishikawa” for short) helped the mills I estimate a 
regression where productivity metrics of mills (measured in physical units) are regressed on the 
dummy equal to 1 if the firm was directed by Ishikawa and 0 otherwise, while controlling for year-
month fixed-effects. The sample is from 1883 (when the first data become available) to 1886, 
which is the last year under government promotion policies and it includes all government-aided 
mills (but excludes the two mills not aided by the government, notably Osaka Spinning Company–
–more on this below). The estimation equation is 
 ݕ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܦ௜ ൅ ߤ௧ ൅ ߳௜௧,       (1) 
where ݕ௜ is the outcome variable, ܦ௜ is the dummy equal to 1 if the firm was advised by Ishikawa 
and 0 otherwise, ߤ௧ is the year-month fixed effect, and ߳௜௧ is the firm-specific random error term. 
I use logged labor productivity (monthly output in weight units, divided by the total number of 
worker-days employed) and logged capital productivity (monthly output in weight units, divided 
by the total number of spindle-days in operation) as outcome variables. I also estimate the 
production function with logged output as a function of logged capital input, logged labor input, 
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and year-month fixed effects and use the residuals from this estimation as a measure of total factor 
productivity, which is then used as the outcome variable in regression (1).x 
 Average capital productivity of the mills guided by Ishikawa is estimated to be about 25 
percent (exp(-0.288) – 1) below that of firms that were not guided by him (statistically highly 
significant); average labor productivity is lower by about 10 percent (statistically significant at the 
5 percent level).  Total factor productivity of Ishikawa-guided mills is about 16 percent lower on 
average than that of mills he did not work with. 
 Productivity differentials in Table 1 show that mills that relied directly on government-
promoted technological knowledge had worse, not better outcomes compared to other mills. In 
principle, those outcomes could be due to some other factors (such as bad luck), not necessarily 
inferior technologies themselves. I therefore use the detailed nature of the available data to 
compare directly technology-related choices made by Ishikawa-guided mills and other mills to see 
if there are systematical differences between the two. 
 Table 2 presents the differences in means of mill size (number of spindles installed), 
power sources (water engine versus steam engine), capital to labor ratios (defined as the number 
of spindles in operation, divided by the number of operative employed in each month), and the 
ratios of female to male factory operatives (blue-collar workers). The sizes of both types of mills 
are very similar (just barely above 2,000 spindles) and reflect the overall government policy of 
subsidizing 2,000-spindle mills across the country (Braguinsky and Hounshell, 2015a). But other 
choices are starkly different. Especially water engines were the main source of power in almost 70 
percent of observations on mills run by Ishikawa but in less than 25 percent of observations on 
mills not run by him. Relying on water engines severely limited the mills’ choices of where to 
locate, creating logistic problems as a result. Given the nature of Japanese climate it also subjected 
them to repeated seasonal shortages of power. Ishikawa’s well-documented insistence on hydro 
energy as the main source of power is even more baffling in view of the fact that both early Satsuma 
mills he had experience with were powered by steam engines. Table 2 also shows that mills 
directed by Ishikawa were significantly more capital-intensive, and tended to employ more female 
operatives relative to male operatives than other mills. As shown below, best practices 
subsequently established in the industry involved labor-intensive production technology, coupled 
with a high share of female operatives in the workforce. Ishikawa’s choice of running capital-
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intensive mills while relying at the same time extensively on female labor thus pushed the industry 
in the wrong direction. 
 Another wrong technological choice made by Ishikawa, which affected all government-
promoted firms, not just those that he supervised directly, was the choice of William Higgins and 
Sons as the machine supplier (recall that the government purchased machines from England and 
then sold it to all subsidized firms). Drafting rollers in those machines were designed for medium-
stapled U.S. cotton and were particularly unfit for short-stapled Japanese cotton which mills used 
as inputs (Tamagawa, 1995). Again, the reason why Ishikawa recommended Higgins and Sons is 
not clear – as mentioned, Satsuma had approached Platt Brothers for machines and engineers for 
its first mill. Platt Brothers later became the main supplier for new private entrants into the industry, 
but not before Osaka Spinning Company re-established contact with it. 
 It is thus apparent that all that the knowledge diffusion through the government-run 
industry association could accomplish was to hammer in all the wrong choices. As summarized in 
a remarkably honest speech by Kokufuku Kan, the manager in charge of one of the government-
subsidized mills, given to Boren in 1885, 
“Lacking capital and educated knowledge, and guided by reckless small-town quasi-
patriotic feeling only because we felt bad about spending 7 million yen per year on 
imported cotton yarn, we unbecomingly planned a great enterprise, letting government 
officials dictate things, not gauging our own ability, and almost completely failed to deliver 
any progress up until this very day.” (cited in Nawa, 1937, p. 98) 
 
To sum up, contrary to some conventional wisdoms, the knowledge transmitted through 
government-owned “model” mills and government-subsidized mills contributed almost nothing to 
the subsequent “winning combination” of technology and management that propelled the industry 
to its success starting in the late 1880s. They did not serve as the training facilities for the right 
kind of managers and engineers either. The right kind of knowledge and the right kind of human 
capital emerged from a totally different source and proliferated by means of a totally different 
mechanism. 
 
IV.2. Osaka Spinning Company and the emergence of new knowledge source 
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The first seed of industry success was planted around the same time as the government started its 
promotion policies but was independent of those. It came from Eiichi Shibusawa, a pioneering 
industrialist who is often dubbed the “father of Japanese capitalism” (see, e.g., Tai, 1993).xi 
Shibusawa, whose career included serving in the inner circle of the last Prince Tokugawa, the top 
military ruler of pre-Meiji Japan, as well as a stint at Meiji government’s Ministry of Finance (he 
left government service in 1873 to become a private entrepreneur), had successfully launched 
several companies, most prominently the First National Bank (the first modern bank in Japan), 
prior to entering cotton spinning. He started planning his mill, eventually called “Osaka Spinning 
Company,” in 1879, that is, around the same time the government started building its Aichi 
National Mill. 
 Arguably, the most important thing that Shibusawa did differently from other 
contemporaneous firms was the decision to obtain his own technologically enlightened human 
capital by tapping into global knowledge. Takeo Yamanobe, a 26-year-old family acquaintance 
who had earlier gone to England to study economics of insurance at the University of London, 
agreed to transfer to the mechanical engineering department at Kings College, Cambridge, and 
then went to acquire practical skills at Rose Hill Mill in Blackburn, Lancashire, where he worked 
regular eight-hour shifts alongside spinning workers (see e.g., Abe, 2004). Yamanobe returned to 
Japan in July 1880 and was given the task of choosing the site and designing the projected mill. 
 Yamanobe not only became the chief engineer and later the CEO of Osaka Spinning 
Company (and its successor, Toyo Spinning), he also subsequently took over the institution of 
knowledge diffusion through the industry association and filled it with the right kind of knowledge 
(and approach; see more on this below). During the first half of the 1880s, however, the 
government was still in charge of the association, and this gives me an opportunity to compare 
technological choices made independently by Osaka Spinning with those that proliferated through 
the extant knowledge sharing mechanism. 
A key novel element in Shibusawa’s technology plan right from the beginning was 
constructing a much larger mill than the standard 2,000-spindle size of government-promoted mills 
(archival evidence shows that by 1880, perhaps even earlier, he had already decided that the scale 
of his mill would be at least 10,000 spindles; see Takamura, 1971, I: 64). The first issue that had 
to be addressed, of course, was securing enough capital. Shibusawa drew on his prior experience 
as the founder of First National Bank to declare a joint stock company, and proceeded to raise 
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capital from a broad and diverse array of private investors.  The initial list of Osaka Spinning 
Company shareholders counted 95 individuals, the largest of whom (Shibusawa himself) owned 
12 percent of the total number of shares.xii 
The process of choosing the power source speaks to how much even Shibusawa and 
Yamanobe were influenced by the prevailing wisdom at Boren early on. For almost a year, 
Yamanobe, accompanied by Ishikawa, toured various potential sites looking to ensure enough 
hydropower for the projected mill. Only in late 1881 was the decision made to turn to the steam 
engine instead (which, of course, proved to be the ultimately correct decision). Since that moment, 
it appears that all the strategic technology decisions pertaining to Osaka Spinning Company’s mill 
were firmly in the hands of Yamanobe who officially became the company’s chief engineer as it 
was incorporated in May 1882. 
Having spent only a few months at Cambridge attending cotton spinning engineering 
classes, and then less than a year at Rose Hill Mill, Yamanobe may not have yet been ready for a 
fully independent role (Saxonhouse, 1974; Abe, 2004). But the contacts he established while in 
Lancashire allowed him to draw on an entirely different source of knowledge than government-
aided mills. The two-story brick building that hosted the machines, which was also the first private 
facility in Japan to introduce electrical lighting, became a source of admiration (and subsequent 
imitation) throughout the industry. Different (and superior) technological choices were made with 
regard to machines as well. As mentioned, Ishikawa had chosen William Higgins and Sons whose 
machines did not fit the type of raw cotton available at the time to Japanese mills. Yamanobe 
worked with Platt Brothers of Oldham to customize their machines so that they could be adjusted 
as much as possible to handle short-staple domestically grown cotton (Farnie and Abe, 2000). This 
also marked the start of a long-term partnership between Platt Brothers and Japanese cotton 
spinners, something that became a central piece of the subsequent industry success (Saxonhouse, 
1974). Moreover, realizing the limits to his own knowledge at the time, Yamanobe invited William 
Nield, a highly regarded veteran Platt Brothers engineer and millwright with vast international 
experience to guide his team. One of the young Japanese assigned to help Nield in this process 
(and learn from him), Katsumasa Okamura, subsequently recalled that “Nield … had extremely 
precise knowledge of the technology and was also a very good teacher. All previous mills had been 
assembled by uneducated workers, guided by people who had worked for Satsuma’s Kagoshima 
mill and themselves possessed only half-baked knowledge.  Ours was … the first time a Japanese 
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cotton spinning mill started operating after being properly assembled and installed, and it made a 
huge difference” (Toyo Boseki, 1986, Vol. I, p. 26). 
Powered by global connectedness that gave it access to new knowledge and superior 
technological and managerial choices, Osaka Spinning Company started operating in 1883 and 
quickly became the only profitable company in the industry at the time. The board of directors 
distributed much of those profits as dividends to shareholders, demonstrating clear awareness of 
the importance of building investors’ confidence. As a result, the company was able to triple its 
capital (and the corresponding mill size) within just a few years, reaching over 30,000 spindles by 
1886. In that year, Osaka Spinning Company was already more than 10 times large than other 
mills, and it alone accounted for more than 46 percent of all cotton yarn produced by the industry. 
As mentioned, it was in that year (from which, not coincidentally, the chronology of modern 
economic growth in Japan starts––see Ohkawa and Rosovsky, 1965) that the government decided 
to put an end to its promotion policies and to let the industry develop on its own. 
 
IV.3. Subsequent knowledge diffusion and the role of relational networks 
The emergence of Osaka Spinning Company gave the fledgling Japanese cotton spinning industry 
its first standout firm. After the government withdrew, independent private entrants started coming 
in. The total number of firms in the industry was 21 in 1886 but it doubled by the end of the decade 
and doubled once again by 1898. Many new entrants (and even some of the extant former 
government-aided firms), not surprisingly, chose to emulate Osaka Spinning Company’s choices. 
The latter’s leading role in determining the overall direction of the industry was cemented in 1888 
when Boren was reorganized into the association of independent producers, its headquarters were 
moved to Osaka Spinning Company premises and Yamanobe became the new chairman. As noted 
below, the new leadership of Boren almost immediately took several crucial steps that put the 
industry on the right track, and more generally, the role of the association in diffusing the best 
practices can hardly be overestimated. At the same time, especially during the initial 5-10 years 
after the industry had been privatized, the degree of uncertainty and, most crucially, the dearth of 
suitable human capital were still severe. This created the situation where technological choices 
made by different firms were still quite different from each other and the eventual uniformity of 
the industry’s practices emphasized, e.g., by Saxonhouse (1974) was still far from complete (see 
Braguinsky and Hounshell, 2015a). This gives me an opportunity to examine how the diffusion of 
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“embodied” knowledge coming from different sources affected the choices made by different 
types of new entrants and how it played out in their outcomes. 
 Table 3 lists all firms that operated in the industry from its inception and until 1898, their 
sources of technological knowledge and some other characteristics; initial mill size, year the mill 
reached the minimum efficient size of 10,000 spindles (if at all), whether it has ever acquired 
another firm (“acquirer” or not), exit year (if exited before 1920) and whether the exit happened 
through acquisition (with the production facilities operating without interruption) or through 
bankruptcy or other reasons that led the mill to shut down its  operations. The sources of 
technological knowledge were traced to prominent engineers (technologists) with independent 
backgrounds (such as the above-mentioned Masatatsu Ishikawa or Takeo Yamanobe) and assigned 
to firms based on an employment contract (for example, Yamanobe was the chief engineer of 
Osaka Spinning Company and Osaka Yoriito at the same time) or primary engineering advising 
role or the spinoff relationship (including former associates or apprentices). 
 As can be seen from Table 3, sources of technological knowledge could be traced to 
specific individuals (engineers) in 73 out of 93 total cases (cases where the sources remained 
unidentified are labeled “N/A” in the third column of Table 3 and mostly pertain to smaller local 
firms or firms with very short histories). Among those, 36 firms derived their technological 
knowledge from engineers with formal training (including those in advisory roles); nine firms, in 
the cluster centered around the city of Okayama in Western Japan were supervised or advised by 
Tomonao Ishiguro and Shin’ichiro Arakawa and their co-workers (Ishiguro was a college-educated 
engineer although in metallurgy, not cotton spinning, while Arakawa was among the first cohort 
of graduates of the Imperial College of Engineering), five firms were supervised or advised by 
Narazo Takatsuji (Imperial College of Engineering graduate); four firms each were supervised or 
advised by the already-mentioned Takeo Yamanobe and his protégé Tsunezo Saito (the Imperial 
College of Engineering graduate whom Yamanobe recommended for the chief engineer position 
at Mie Cotton Spinning), and by Kyozo Kikuchi and Hidehisa Shimoyama (also Imperial College 
of Engineering graduates); three firms had access to services of Seizaburo Kawai (another Imperial 
College of Engineering graduate), two firms each employed Takeshi Yamaguchi (English-
educated engineer, although not in cotton spinning), Shun’ichi Hattori and Tomokichi Yoshida 
(the latter two Imperial College of Engineering graduates), and, finally, one firm was advised by 
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England-educated Naosada Taniguchi. With the exception of Shimoyama, Kawai, and Yoshida, 
all the above engineers had experience in England. 
 Engineers mentioned above practically exhausted the list of all college-educated 
engineers available to cotton spinning firms in Japan in the late 1880s–early 1890s. It is therefore 
not surprising that many new entrants still had to resort to non-college-educated technical 
personnel. The most prolific source of knowledge for such firms remained Masatatsu Ishikawa, 
who retired from government service in 1887 but continued in his advisory role for the privatized 
industry, and his associates and apprentices. Thirteen new entrants relied on this source of 
knowledge, bringing the total number of firms under Ishikawa’s influence to 21 and creating a 
situation in which it is possible to directly compare older and newer sources of knowledge in 
contemporaneous competition under the same market environment. 
 As it turns out, the new sources of knowledge generated by college-educated engineers 
played by far the most important role in the industry success, both overall and individual firms. A 
crucially important early instance came around 1887 when three of those (Hattori, Saito, and 
Kikuchi, all of them Imperial College graduates, Hattori and Saito just a year apart) found 
themselves in England sent there by their respective employers for training and to place orders for 
spinning machines at the same time. Aided also by Senjiro Watanabe, Mitsui Trading’s 
representative in London, they arrived at an innovative decision to start importing to Japan ring 
spinning machines rather than mules that had been imported until that time (see, e.g., Tamagawa, 
1997). The subsequent speed of diffusion of ring technology in Japan was the fastest in the world 
(Saxonhouse and Wright, 1984). Just about a year or so later, Boren, led by Yamanobe and his 
Osaka Spinning Company, organized a mission to India to study the possibility of importing Indian 
cotton to replace short-stapled Japanese and Chinese cotton which was not suitable for mechanized 
spinning and the use of which put severe limitations in the way of improved productivity and 
performance of Japanese mills. The almost simultaneous adoption of ring spinning technology and 
longer-stapled Indian (and later also the U.S.) cotton were the two most important factors that 
propelled the industry towards its spectacular success (see, e.g., Tamagawa, 1995; Braguinsky and 
Hounshell, 2015a). The tradition of knowledge sharing established under early Boren and 
continuing under Osaka Spinning Company leadership meant that the knowledge about the 
superiority of Indian cotton and ring spinning frames diffused extremely fast. Samples of yarn 
spun using Indian cotton were distributed to all firms, and Boren also negotiated a discount on 
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shipping costs for imported cotton as well as the elimination of the (fairly low in any event) import 
tariff on raw cotton which applied equally to all its members. The actual adoption of those new 
technologies by individual firms, however, was also influenced by the sources of their individual 
technological knowledge. 
 Ring spinning machines became the universal choice for all mills that started operating 
after 1887 (the only exception was Nihon Spinning Company, which, led by Kikuchi, deliberately 
imported mules to experiment with higher-quality cotton yarn). After all, it only took emulating 
the orders placed by industry leaders, which did not require any particular skills (and was aided by 
the fact that all such orders went through the same London office of Mitsui Trading that had been 
involved in first purchases of ring machines). Employing longer-stapled Indian and U.S. cotton, 
on the other hand, turned out to be more difficult for some of them. The penetration of Indian and 
U.S. cotton and the phasing out of the Japanese and Chinese raw cotton took almost a decade and 
was only completed by the turn of the twentieth  century. Most importantly, through this process 
individual mills developed their own proprietary technology of cotton mixing, something that, 
according to economic historians, qualifies as the first globally important innovation to emerge in 
the young cotton spinning industry in Japan and became one of the major sources of its 
international competitiveness (Saxonhouse and Wright, 2010). 
The earliest firm-level data on different types of cotton input used by each individual mill 
are available for 1893. In that year non-Japanese and non-Chinese sources of cotton accounted for 
about fifty percent of the total amount of raw cotton consumed by the industry but there was wide 
variation across different mills. In Table 4 I present binary comparisons observed between the 
firms whose sources of knowledge came from college-educated engineers and all other firms; 
among the latter; I also distinguish between the firms that were guided by Ishikawa and all others. 
The comparisons show the differences in means of the combined fraction of Indian and U.S. cotton 
in the total amount of raw cotton consumed by each category of mills and in the degree to which 
they engaged in cotton mixing. This last metric (“cotton mixing index”) was constructed as follows. 
I first assigned a dummy equal to 1 to each type of cotton if its usage in 1893 was 5 percent or 
more of the total quantity of cotton consumed by the mill and zero otherwise. I then added all these 
dummies together. For example, Osaka Spinning Company used 41.3 percent Chinese cotton and 
54.3 percent Indian cotton in 1893, while other types constituted less than 5 percent of its total 
consumption, so its “cotton mixing index” assumes the value of 2, and so on. 
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The results show that the fraction of Indian and U.S. cotton in total in 1893 was more than 
twice as high in firms with college-educated engineers in charge than in all other firms (the 
difference is highly statistically significant). Such firms also had on average 3.3 different types of 
cotton accounting for at least 5 percent of their total cotton consumption, compared to 2.5 types 
for all other firms (the difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level). In contrast, 
having Ishikawa or his associates as knowledge source did not render any advantage in terms of 
adopting imported cotton and developing cotton-mixing technology, as can be seen from the 
comparisons in the third row of Table 4. Thus, even in technological choices that were initiated 
and diffused through Boren, it was important to have the right kind of engineering personnel in 
charge of individual mills to take full advantage of superior technological opportunities. 
The difference in the speed with which new industry-wide technological choices diffused 
across firms with different knowledge sources is also manifested in differences in capital-labor 
ratios and female to male factory operatives. Adopting ring spinning frames and especially cotton-
mixing technology required a shift toward lower capital-labor ratio (caused by an increase in the 
number of workers per spindle, including those employed in preparatory stages) and a shift towards 
a higher fraction of female operatives in their total number (Saxonhouse and Wright, 1984a; 2010). 
Table 5 presents binary comparisons similar to Table 4 along these two dimensions. Firms deriving 
their knowledge sources from college-educated engineers have markedly lower capital-labor ratios 
and higher female to male operatives ratio than all other firms. Here, Ishikawa-influenced firms 
can also be seen to be ahead of other firms with no college-educated engineers in charge, especially 
in the degree to which they relied on female labor force. 
Differences in technological choices have a predictable impact also on firms’ performance. 
In Table 6 I present the differences in mean total factor productivity and mean profitability between 
firms that derived their source of knowledge from college-educated engineers, from Ishikawa and 
his apprentices, and all other firms. Total factor productivity is measured as the residuals from 
estimating the production function as in equation (1) above; separate estimates of labor and capital 
productivity as in Table 1 above yield very similar results. For profitability, I utilize balance sheets 
data published in the association’s monthly bulletin in 1893-94. These are not available for all 
firms, and the largest number of observations (on 33 firms) pertains to the first half of 1894 which 
are the data I utilize in Table 6 (using all available data leads to qualitatively similar results but 
introduces potential bias because of missing observations on some but not other firms). I employ 
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the “return on assets” measure, which is the amount of profit (or loss) reported by the firm, divided 
by the total value of all assets on its balance sheet. It can be seen that firms with college-educated 
engineers as their knowledge source economically and statistically significantly outperformed all 
other firms in terms of both productivity and profitability of their operations. Thus, their 
technological choices were indeed superior. In contrast, firms that got supervision and/or advice 
from Ishikawa had both lower productivity and profitability than even firms that did not have 
college-educated engineers. These results are robust to excluding firms founded before 1887, that 
is, limiting the sample only to post-government promotion era entrants. 
The knowledge diffusion process through the association eventually led to convergence in 
technological choices across firms, despite different idiosyncratic knowledge sources. As already 
mentioned, the penetration of ring spinning frames and imported raw cotton from India and the 
U.S. were by and large completed by the second half of the 1890s. In what follows I present some 
comparisons across firm categories above for the year 1898 which was one of the last years of the 
first phase of industry growth (see Figure 2 above) and also the last year of operations for some 
firms that went bankrupt and/or were acquired in late 1898-1899. 
Table 7 confirms that technological practices were much more uniform by 1898. The 
capital to labor ratios are by this time remarkably similar across all categories of firms and while 
the female to male operatives ratio is statistically higher in firms with sources of knowledge from 
college-educated engineers as compared to all other firms (and lower in Ishikawa-advised firms), 
the difference is much less in magnitude than it was in 1893 (Table 5 above) and economically is 
no longer significant. There is no economic or statistical difference across different firm categories 
in terms of total factor productivity in 1898 either, which is also a reflection of uniform 
technological practices as well as capital vintage differences (whereby newer entrants were able 
to take advantage of opportunities provided by imported raw cotton and order faster and more 
versatile machines for their mills––see Braguinsky, Ohyama, Okazaki, and Syverson, 2015). 
Nevertheless, as shown in Table 8, the all-important profitability, mill size and exporter status 
outcomes are still very different. Specifically, firms with college-educated engineers as their 
knowledge source are more than 2.5 times larger than all other firms, their average returns on 
assets are higher than in other firms, and they are also much more likely to be among exporting 
firms. Notably, firms in the Ishikawa network also separated themselves by 1898 from the rest of 
the industry––their mean returns on assets are actually economically and statistically the same as 
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in firms with college-educated engineers, while their propensity to be exporters is in-between the 
firms led by college-educated engineers and the rest of the industry. 
 
V. Some lessons 
The “nanoeconomic” analysis of knowledge diffusion in the Meiji-era Japanese cotton spinning 
industry revealed findings that are consistent with the stylized facts discovered by an array of 
previous studies mentioned in the Introduction.  
First, even though not the first entrant, Osaka Spinning Company was the first standout 
firm in the industry and the initial blueprint for success was almost entirely its creation.  
Second, knowledge, both good and bad, was indeed transmitted through an “embodied” 
channel. Yamanobe, the Osaka Spinning’s chief engineer’s experience and contacts in England 
played the crucial role in acquiring and transmitting the right kind of knowledge, as did similar 
experiences and contacts of other leading engineers (such as Saito of Mie Spinning, Kikuchi of 
Hirano, Settsu, Amagasaki, and Nihon Spinning, Sanji Muto of Kanegafuchi Spinning––he was 
unique in being not an engineer but a professional manager and his experience was in the U.S.). 
But the government appointee (Ishikawa)’s influence led to wrong technological choices, at least 
initially, and almost led the whole industry astray. 
Third, good knowledge eventually won through competition. Idiosyncratic knowledge 
sources continued to play an important role in individual firms, and only through competitive 
pressures (exit versus expansion, including through acquisitions) did the industry eventually 
converge to the best practices. 
At the same time, the analysis above provides us with some new insights into the two 
research questions posed in Section II.2, namely, what the most important factors for knowledge 
diffusion are, and how to make sure that the knowledge being diffused is of the right kind. 
Early on, Japanese cotton spinning industry was a typical candidate for failure––with no 
established knowledge base and no independent financing sources; the measures taken by the 
government were misguided both in terms of incentives and, even more so, in terms of promoting 
and diffusing wrong technological and managerial solutions. 
The success of the industry came through private initiative. Even though Japan at the time 
was a developing nation, and capital accumulation was at a very low level, a way was found to 
generate access to much-needed initial finance through the system of “business promoters” whose 
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role was to coordinate private investors and provide monitoring services (Miyamoto, 2010, Ch. 3, 
5; see also Miwa and Ramseyer, 2000). Indeed, Eiichi Shibusawa who founded Osaka Spinning 
Company is widely recognized as the most prominent such promoter. Importantly, Shibusawa 
elected not to rely on government assistance, but instead tapped into a global knowledge source. 
This created a solid foundation for building a competitive high-tech industry for the first time. 
In terms of mechanisms for knowledge diffusion process early in the industry life-cycle, 
the most important lessons from the story presented in this paper can be summarized as follows. 
First, a collaborative institutional arrangement by itself is not a guarantee of the diffusion of the 
best practices. The Meiji government deserves credit for creating Boren as an institution for 
knowledge diffusion, but its first six years present a stark reminder that such an institutional 
arrangement is a double-edged sword, and can easily lead the industry astray if wrong choices are 
made at the outset by unqualified leadership. Second, and related, diversity of knowledge sources 
and their unfettered competition (even as the firms also cooperated with each other) were the main 
reason why the industry found the right way and ended up with the right kind of enlightened human 
capital for successful technology adoption and diffusion.  
Japan’s Meiji-era cotton spinning industry has been cited in the literature as an example 
of almost seamless technology adoption through the action of the industry association acting as a 
single, cooperative decision-making unit. In fact this is hardly the case. Nanoeconomic, firm- and 
individual-level analysis shows that the main reason why the industry’s catch up could be 
completed in what was indeed historically rather short period of time was that the environment 
fostered superior human capital, whose better ideas had a chance to prove themselves and prevail 
through competition in markets for inputs, output and assets (both physical and human). 
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Figure 1. Japan’s domestic output, import and export of cotton yarn (1883-1890) 
 
Source: For years 1887-90 “Nihon Choki Tokei Soran” (Long-Term Statistics of Japan), 1987; for 
years 1883-86 my estimates based on the totals for all firms listed in “Kampo” (“Official Gaztette”). 
The data for 1883 are available only for 6 months, while for 1884-85 these are available for 8 
months and for 10 months in 1886. To estimate annual output I have multiplied the total output 
for all available months by 2 in 1883, by 1.5 in 1884-85 and by 1.2 in 1886. 
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Figure 2. Japan’s domestic output, import and export of cotton yarn (1891-1900) 
  
Source: “Nihon Choki Tokei Soran” (Long-Term Statistics of Japan), 1987. 
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Table 1. Productivity of government-owned and subsidized firms supervised and not 
supervised by Ishikawa in 1883-86. 
 
    
Logged labor 
productivity 
Logged capital 
productivity 
Total factor 
productivity 
Supervised by 
Ishikawa dummy 
Coefficien
t -0.101 ** -0.288 *** -0.170 *** 
St. Error 0.041   0.040   0.037   
Constant 
Coefficien
t 0.092 *** -3.303 *** 0.114 *** 
St. Error 0.034   0.033   0.029   
Year-month dummies Included 
Observations 371 371 371 
Adj. R-squared 0.226 0.406 -0.028 
 
Note: The total number of firms is 19, 11 of them supervised by Ishikawa and 8 not supervised. Available monthly 
data on firm operations for years 1883-1886 (32 months total). Labor productivity is calculated as monthly output (in 
weight units), divided by total number of worker-days employed; capital productivity is calculated as monthly output 
(in weight units), divided by the total number of spindle-days in operation. Multifactor productivity is calculated as 
the residual from the production function estimated by OLS with logged output as the dependent variable, and logged 
spindle-days in operation, logged worker-days employed and year-month dummies as independent variables. 
 
Table 2. Technology choices of government-owned and subsidized mills  
supervised and not supervised by Ishikawa in 1883-86 
    
    
Supervised by 
Ishikawa 
Not supervised by 
Ishikawa   
Size (number of spindles 
installed) 
Mean  2,196  2,200    
St. Error  86  109    
Powered by water engines 
Mean 0.70 0.24 *** 
St. Error 0.03 0.03   
Capital to labor ratio 
Mean 38.39 32.36 *** 
St. Error 0.97 1.15   
Female to male operatives 
ratio 
Mean 2.61 1.98 *** 
St. Error 0.07 0.04  
Note: See Table 1. *** indicates that the difference in means is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, using a 
double-sided t-test with unequal variance. 
Table 3. Sources of technological knowledge  
Mill name Year started 
operating 
Technological 
knowledge source 
Initial mill size 
(spindles) 
Year reached 
10,000 spindles  
Acquirer Exit year Exited by 
acquisition 
Kagoshima 1867 British advisors 3,648 N/A No 1898 No 
Sakai 1870 Ishikawa 2,000 N/A No 1889 No 
Kashima 1872 Unosuke Kashima 720 N/A No 1889 No 
Dojima) 1880 Yamanobe/Saito* 2,440 1891 No 1896 No 
Himeji 1880 Yamao  2,000 N/A No 1899 No 
Aichi National 1881 Ishikawa 2,000 N/A No 1896 No 
Ichikawa 1882 Ishikawa 2,000 N/A No 1914 Yes 
Kawashima 1882 Ishikawa 2,000 N/A No Evolved into Mie 
Kuwanohara 1882 Ishikawa 2,000 N/A No 1900 No 
Okayama 1882 Ishiguro/Arakawa* 2,000 1893 Yes 1907 Yes 
Shimomura 1882 Ishikawa 2,000 N/A - No 1912 No 
Tamashima 1882 Ishiguro/Arakawa* 2,000 1888 No 1898 No 
Hiroshima  1883 Ishikawa 2,000 x 2  N/A No N/A N/A 
Miyagi 1883 Kashima 2,000 N/A No 1912 No 
Osaka 1883 Yamanobe/Saito* 10,500 1883 Yes N/A N/A 
Nagasaki 1884 N/A 2,000 N/A No 1892 No 
Shimada 1884 Ishikawa 2,000 N/A No 1917 No 
Toyoi 1884 Ishikawa 2,000 N/A No 1895 No 
Enshu 1885 Ishikawa 2,000 N/A No 1899 No 
Nagoya 1885 Ishikawa 4,000 1889 No 1905 Yes 
Shimotsuke 1885 Ishikawa 2,000 1910 No 1911 Yes 
Osaka Yoriito 1887 Yamanobe/Saito*  4,608  N/A No 1903 Yes 
Fujii 1888 Ishiguro/Arakawa*  1,136  N/A No 1902 No 
Kofu 1888 Ishikawa  2,064  N/A No 1907 No 
Mie 1888 Yamanobe/Saito*  10,440  1888 Yes N/A N/A 
Naniwa 1888 Suzuki  4,500  1889 No 1898 No 
Tenma 1888 Kawai*  6,864  1889 No 1899 Yes 
Hirano 1889 Kikuchi*  4,992  1890 Yes 1902 Yes 
Kanegafuchi 1889 Yoshida*  30,356  1889 Yes N/A N/A 
Kurashiki 1889 Yamaguchi*  4,472  1894 Yes N/A N/A 
Owari 1889 Hattori*  15,360  1889 No 1905 Yes 
  
35
35
Tokyo 1889 Kashima  9,104  1894 No 1914 Yes 
Wakayama 1889 Ishikawa  4,044  1893 No 1911 Yes 
Yawata 1889 Suzuki  2,000  N/A No 1890 No 
Saitama - Shimoyama*  2,000  N/A No 1890 No 
Kanakin 1890 Takatsuji*  13,552  1890 Yes 1906 Yes 
Shodoshima 1890 Ishiguro/Arakawa*  2,016  N/A No 1899 Yes 
Uwa 1890 Suzuki  2,064  1896 No 1902 No 
Amagasaki 1891 Kikuchi*  11,136  1891 Yes N/A N/A 
Kurume 1891 Ishikawa  5,160  1895 No 1899 Yes 
Miike 1891 Shimoyama*  10,368  1890 Yes 1902 Yes 
Senshu 1891 Kawai* 10324 1891 No 1903 Yes 
Settsu 1891 Kikuchi*  19,968  1890 Yes 1918 Yes 
Yamashiro 1891 N/A 1152 N/A No 1898 No 
Fukuyama 1893 Ishiguro/Arakawa* 4608 1897 No 1903 Yes 
Iyo 1893 N/A 5376 N/A No 1903 Yes 
Tenma Orimono 1893 N/A 2064 1909 No N/A N/A 
Asahi  1894 Yamaguchi* 14924 1894 No 1898 No 
Fukushima 1894 Ishikawa 8256 1895 Yes N/A N/A 
Kishiwada 1894 Suzuki 10368 1894 Yes N/A N/A 
Koriyama 1894 Ishikawa 5326 1895 No 1907 Yes 
Matsuyama 1894 N/A 4992 1907 No 1918 Yes 
Meiji 1894 Hagino 7668 1896 No 1902 Yes 
Onagigawa 1894 Shimoyama* 4060 N/A No 1903 Yes 
Sakai 1894 N/A 5376 1896 Yes 1917 Yes 
Takaoka 1894 Kawai* 5096 1899 No 1915 Yes 
Wakayama 1894 Ishikawa 5696 1910 Yes N/A N/A 
Banyo Seimai  1895 N/A 2184 N/A No 1900 No 
Kashiwazaki 1895 N/A 2304 N/A No 1901 Yes 
Kumamoto 1895 Shimoyama* 4608 1897 No 1899 Yes 
Noda 1895 N/A 4992 1897 No 1898 Yes 
Tsushima 1895 Ishikawa 9216 1897 No 1906 Yes 
Ajino 1896 N/A 6912 N/A No 1903 Yes 
Awaji 1896 N/A 5000 1898 No 1900 Yes 
Fushimi 1896 Takatsuji* 10864 1896 No 1900 Yes 
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Harima 1896 Yamao 10368 1896 No 1912 Yes 
Heian 1896 N/A 7156 1900 Yes 1903 No 
Ise 1896 Ishiguro/Arakawa* 2940 N/A No 1900 Yes 
Kasaoka 1896 Ishiguro/Arakawa* 9984 1899 No 1909 Yes 
Kuwana 1896 Hattori* 3840 1897 No 1907 Yes 
Kyoto 1896 Takatsuji* 2304 1897 No 1901 Yes 
Nihon 1896 Kikuchi* 44160 1896 Yes 1916 Yes 
Sanshugumi 1896 N/A 960 N/A No 1900 No 
Bizen 1897 Ishiguro/Arakawa* 6144 1898 No 1907 Yes 
Hakata Kinuwata 1897 Ishiguro/Arakawa* 5760 1898 No 1902 Yes 
Ichinomiya 1897 Hagino 10780 1897 No 1907 Yes 
Isechuo 1897 N/A 15360 N/A No 1897 Yes 
Nihon Boshoku 1897 N/A 5712 1897 No 1905 Yes 
Osaka Menshi 1897 N/A 3246 N/A No 1901 No 
Saidaiji 1897 N/A 6912 N/A No 1898 Yes 
Sanuki 1897 N/A 10000 1897 No 1918 Yes 
Awa 1898 Ishikawa 5376 N/A No 1907 Yes 
Chugoku 1898 N/A 4992 1899 No 1902 Yes 
Fuji 1898 Taniguchi* 28256 1898 Yes N/A N/A 
Kashu 1898 Suzuki 10368 1898 No 1898 Yes 
Nakatsu 1898 N/A 10368 1898 No 1902 Yes 
Nihon Hosoito 1898 Hagino 20096 1898 No 1903 Yes 
Tokyo Gasu 1898 Hibiya 20568 1898 No 1906 Yes 
Yamato 1898 Takatsuji* 11520 1898 No 1902 Yes 
Chita 1899 Ishikawa 13056 1899 No 1907 Yes 
Kunijima 1899 Takatsuji* 9184 N/A No 1899 Yes 
Shanghai 1899 Yoshida* 19840 1899 No 1899 Yes 
Yawatahama 1899 Suzuki 5376 N/A No 1903 Yes 
Note: N/A in the “Source of technological knowledge” means that engineers / technical advisors are unknown. N/A in “Year reached 10,000 spindles” means that 
the mill has never reached this threshold (at least as an independent firm). N/A in “Exit year” and “Exit by acquisition” means that the firm survived at least until 
1920. * denotes college graduates. 
 
Table 4. Knowledge sources and penetration of cotton mixing, 1893 
Source of knowledge 
Fraction of Indian and U.S. cotton in 
total 
Cotton mixing 
index 
College-educated 
engineer 
Yes 0.458 *** 3.278 ** 
No 0.210  2.500  
Ishikawa 
Yes 0.170 *** 2.385 ** 
No 0.410  3.120  
Ishikawa 
Yes 0.170  2.385  
No
* 0.285  2.714  
Note: Last row excludes non-Ishikawa supervised firms whose source of knowledge came from college-educated 
engineers. ***, and ** indicate that the corresponding difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent and 5 
percent level, respectively, using double-sided t-test. 
 
Table 5. Knowledge sources and capital to labor and  
female to male operatives ratios, 1893 
Source of knowledge Capital to labor ratio Female to male operatives ratio
College-educated engineer 
Yes 14.595 *** 3.816 ***
No 19.244  2.828  
Ishikawa 
Yes 18.119 *** 2.987 ***
No 16.356  3.485  
Ishikawa 
Yes 18.119 *** 2.987 ***
No* 21.692  2.482  
Note: Last row excludes non-Ishikawa supervised firms whose source of knowledge came from college-educated 
engineers. *** indicates that the corresponding difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, using 
double-sided t-test. 
 
Table 6. Knowledge sources and firm outcomes (1893-94) 
Source of knowledge 
Total factor productivity 
(1893) ROA (1894, first half)
College-educated 
engineer 
Mean 0.085 *** 0.131 * 
St. Error 0.019  0.014  
Ishikawa 
Mean -0.098 *** 0.078 * 
St. Error 0.016  0.019  
Other (constant) 
Mean -0.047  0.110  
St. Error 0.030  0.016  
Note: Total factor productivity measure is the average residuals from estimating the production function as in (1) in 
the main text. ROA is return on assets, firms’ reported profits divided over the value of total assets in the balance 
sheet. ***, and * indicate that the corresponding difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent and 10 percent 
level, respectively, using double-sided t-test. 
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Table 7. Knowledge sources, capital to labor ratio, 
female to male operatives ratio, and total factor productivity, 1898 
Source of knowledge 
Capital to labor 
ratio 
Female to male 
operatives ratio 
Total factor 
productivity 
College-educated 
engineer 
Mean 15.772   3.829 *** -0.008  
St. Error 0.240    0.065   0.015  
Ishikawa 
Mean 14.852    3.423 *** -0.005  
St. Error 0.368    0.062   0.018  
Other (constant) 
Mean 15.907    3.660 ** 0.016  
St. Error 0.396    0.065   0.018  
Note: Total factor productivity measure is the average residuals from estimating the production function as in (1) in 
the main text. *** and ** indicate that the corresponding difference is statistically significant at the 1 and 5 percent 
level, respectively, using double-sided t-test. 
 
Table 8. Knowledge sources and some outcomes (1898) 
Source of knowledge 
ROA (first 
half) 
Size (number of 
spindles) 
Exporter 
status 
College-educated 
engineer 
Mean 0.042 **  22,527 *** 0.516 ***
St. Error 0.017   3,506   0.091   
Ishikawa 
Mean 0.045 **  8,433 * 0.250   
St. Error 0.011    1,622   0.112   
Other (constant) 
Mean -0.015    9,855   0.133   
St. Error 0.019    1,458   0.063   
Note: ROA is return on assets, firms’ reported profits divided over the value of total assets in the balance sheet. ***, 
**, and * indicate that the corresponding difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
level, respectively, using double-sided t-test. 
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Endnotes 
i Saxonhouse (1974) represents the first serious study of this story in English-language literature, 
although some of its aspects had been mentioned (often with misinterpretations, more on which 
below) by economic historians long before him (e.g., Smith, 1955; Landes, 1965). Among the 
Japanese historians, the two-volume treatise by Naosuke Takamura (1971) stands unsurpassed in 
many aspects even today by the breadth and depth of his coverage and careful attention to 
important details. Other contributions in the English-language literature include Saxonhouse and 
Wright (1984 and 2010), Ranis and Saxonhouse (1985), Ohyama, Braguinsky, and Murhpy (2004), 
Braguinsky and Rose (2009), Braguinsky, Ohyama, Okazaki, and Syverson (2015), and 
Braguinsky and Hounshell (2015a and b). 
ii “[T]he astonishing ascendance of Osaka over Lancashire stands as the first completely successful 
instance of Asian assimilation of modern Western manufacturing techniques” (Saxonhouse, 1974: 
150). 
iii See also Foster and Rosenzweig (1985), Conley and Udri (2010) 
iv For example, Ransom Olds, the first great entrepreneur in the auto industry in Detroit, “probably 
trained more men of prime importance to the industry to-day than any other producer” (Doolittle, 
1916, cited in Klepper, 2011: 145). 
v Cynics point out that this stance might have also been related to the anti-trust litigation brought 
up against AT&T, the parent of Bell Labs at the time by the U.S. authorities. Recent investigative 
journalism has found that the situation may have changed in more recent years. See, e.g., Ames, 
M., “Revealed: Apple and Google’s wage-fixing cartel involved dozens more companies, over one 
million employees,” Pando Daily, Mar 22, 2014, http://bit.ly/1Ee1X0e. I am grateful to an 
anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this. That said, there were attempts to introduce a 
“no recruiting rule” among competing semiconductor firms in early years too, although in practice 
they did not seem to work (Tilton, 1971, p. 78). The same was true in the Japanese cotton spinning 
industry circa late 19th century examined in the current paper. Examination of the actual 
effectiveness of the recent Silicon Valley wage-fixing cartel is a fascinating task for future research. 
vi Lerner (2009) describes how SBIR (Small Business Innovation Research) program in the U.S. 
worked only in regions where high-tech venture funds were already operating. When the need to 
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listen to private venture industry was ignored in the name of “diversity,” “the program funded 
firms with inferior prospects.” (p. 130) 
vii “Count” measures the thickness of the yarn, or how many yards of yarn are contained in each 
pound. The higher the count, the finer the thread. Producing yarn of higher counts (which is needed 
to produce higher-quality cloth) requires better-quality cotton input, more advanced technology, 
and more skilled labor, and it was a big challenge facing Japan’s fledgling industry. 
viii Saxonhouse was the first Western scholar to use these data in his dissertation (Saxonhouse, 
1971). However, it appears that he (and many subsequent researchers) was under the erroneous 
impression that the first data became available only in July 1889 (when Boren’s monthly bulletin 
was first published). In fact, as mentioned above, earlier data are also available in archives, through 
the government “Official Gazette” (Kampo). I thank Naosuke Takamura for pointing this out to 
me. The data used in this paper were coded by myself (for the years 1883-1893) and by Tetsuji 
Okazaki (for years 1894 and beyond). I thank Prof. Okazaki for generously sharing the data he has 
coded. 
ix The mission also included 15 young men and boys, known as “Satsuma students,” with orders 
to stay in England and learn sciences and engineering. Many of them later played key roles in 
modernizing Japan (Cobbing, 2000). Satsuma became one of the two main powers in the coalition 
that ushered in the new Meiji government  
x I use work-days and spindle-days as my measures of labor and capital inputs and not work-hours 
and spindle-hours because the data on hours in operation are not available for the year of 1885. 
Using inputs adjusted also for hours per day the mill operated while dropping the 1885 
observations leads to qualitatively very similar results. 
xi It appears that Shibusawa arrived at the idea that Japan needed its own cotton spinning industry 
in order to limit the amount of money it spent on imports in 1879, about the same time as the 
government embarked on its model mill-building policy (Geppo, 1921, September, pp. 31-32). 
xii  Raising all the initially planned capital turned out to be difficult even for someone like 
Shibusawa; his initial plan had been to start the mill with 12,000 spindles but he was forced to start 
with 10,500 instead because of the capital constraint (Takamura, 1971, Vol. I, pp. 66-67). 
